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Introduction
One of the important innovations of 
the merit system of judicial selec-
tion is its attempt to maintain elec-
toral accountability for judges while 
removing the need for judges to 
square off head-to-head in com-
petitive elections. The retention 
elections used by most merit plan 
systems allow citizens the oppor-
tunity to remove underperforming 
judges at the ballot box. At the same 
time, they are designed in the hopes 
of minimizing the need for campaign-
ing and fundraising that competitive 
elections increasingly require.1
A side effect of the absence of sig-
nificant campaigning, however, is 
that the voter is left with precious 
little information with which to eval-
uate judges standing for retention.2 
In contested elections, the cam-
paign process provides information 
to voters about both the challenger 
and the incumbent.3 The challenger 
in the race has a strong incentive to 
make public whatever shortcom-
ings the incumbent judge may have. 
Indeed, challengers typically seek 
out weak incumbents in the hopes 
that they will stand a better chance 
of winning.4 As a result, the public 
is exposed to information about an 
incumbent’s less impressive record. 
Where there is no challenger, there is 
no significant campaign, and voters 
get little information about the 
incumbent. Turnout in these uncon-
tested elections is low, and ballot 
roll-off is high.5
The same lack of information 
plagues retention elections, which 
are uncontested by definition. 
Perhaps this is one reason very few 
judges lose retention elections. Pre-
vious research has indicated less 
than 1 percent of judges have been 
removed from the bench due to a 
failed retention election.6 States 
with retention elections have recog-
nized this problem. The most impor-
tant step these states have taken to 
counteract this dearth of informa-
tion is the creation of formal, state-
sponsored judicial performance 
evaluation (JPE) programs. These 
programs, universally modeled 
after the American Bar Association’s 
Guidelines for the Evaluation of Judi-
cial Perfomance,7 aspire to provide 
useful, fair, and relevant information 
for voters to use when making voting 
decisions.
This research aims to determine 
whether JPE programs are actually 
providing useful, fair, and relevant 
information by discussing JPEs in 
general and specifically analyzing 
Colorado’s process of judicial evalua-
tion. What we find is that Colorado’s 
evaluation tool suffers from gender 
bias, resulting in lower scores for 
female judges when we control for 
other mitigating factors. We urge all 
JPE programs to continue to monitor 
and evaluate their programs to guard 
against such bias. We agree with 
David Brody’s claim that some infor-
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mation can be seen as better than no 
information to assist voters make 
retention decisions.8 However, we 
also agree with Christine Durham’s 
claim that “we are expending too 
much time, money, and institutional 
credibility if the results (of JPEs) are 
contaminated by bias and are, there-
fore, unreliable.”9 Our hope is that 
this research can begin a discussion 
to make reliable and effective JPEs a 
reality.
The Basics of Judicial Performance 
Evaluation
JPEs are a critical component of judi-
cial selection, especially in states 
that hold retention elections for 
their judges. The presence of JPEs 
fulfills a number of important func-
tions. First, JPEs provide voters with 
needed information to use when 
casting their ballots in a judicial elec-
tion.10 The hope is that this informa-
tion will turn retention elections into 
a viable tool for providing meaning-
ful accountability.11 Second, it can 
be an important tool for protecting 
the quality of judges on the bench 
by incentivizing self-improvement.12 
Finally, proponents argue that state-
sponsored JPE systems can educate 
the public about the state justice 
system, increasing the legitimacy of 
the state courts.13
While JPEs do provide a very 
valuable service to judges, lawyers, 
public officials, and voters, there is a 
question of whether such measures 
impede judicial independence. It can 
be argued that judicial independence 
is retained so long as evaluations are 
free of critiques of outcomes of spe-
cific cases.14 However, with any sort of 
survey instrument, respondents can 
use the survey to rate judges lower 
than actually warranted because of 
a (perceived) poor outcome in a spe-
cific case.15 Or, sometimes judges will 
only be evaluated by individuals who 
feel the judge deserves criticism, 
while those who feel the judge is sat-
isfactorily completing his duties will 
neglect to complete an evaluation.16 
These concerns are easily overcome 
with information that is included in 
the performance evaluation that is 
not derived from survey data (like 
courtroom observations and/or 
interviews with the judges them-
selves).
Although some observers have 
dismissed “the concerns about the 
subjectivity of legitimate evalua-
tion factors” as “infinitesimal,”17 
most proponents of JPE systems 
have long recognized the impor-
tance of addressing concerns about 
the “fairness of survey methodolo-
gies and evaluation commission pro-
cedures.”18 The judicial evaluation 
system in Colorado, and others of 
its kind, grew out of a self-conscious 
attempt to achieve both precision 
and fairness. Supporters of the model 
saw Colorado’s JPE system as nearly 
ideal, anticipating that it would serve 
as a model for other states to follow.19
Currently, 18 merit plan states 
and the District of Columbia have a 
formal, state-sponsored JPE system 
in place, although Colorado’s system 
is still considered the most com-
prehensive in the nation.20 These 
systems are all derived from recom-
mendations contained in the ABA 
Guidelines,21 although states vary 
widely in terms of their adoption of 
the more complicated and expensive 
recommendations provided in the 
reports. All of these programs have 
a few important characteristics in 
common: They are organized as com-
missions that are state sanctioned as 
the official evaluating body for state 
judges; each uses at least one survey 
instrument to solicit evaluations of 
the judges from people outside the 
commission; they publish at least 
some of their findings for public con-
sumption; and each contains some 
type of judicial self-improvement 
component.22
The Role of JPE Commissions
In 2005, the ABA released its Guide-
lines for the Evaluation of Judicial 
Performance.23 These Guidelines 
urge all court systems to create 
an evaluation program, and they 
provide standards for the process. 
The main purpose of these systems 
is to promote self-improvement of 
judges, improve the overall quality 
of judges, and to provide information 
to individuals responsible for decid-
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ing whether to reappoint, retain, or 
reelect judges.24 The ABA envisioned 
the JPE commission to be the central 
figure in this process. The commis-
sions are charged with developing an 
evaluation program, administering 
it, gathering the required informa-
tion, and analyzing and presenting 
the results. According to the ABA, 
the creation and staffing of JPE com-
missions should be the responsibil-
ity of the highest court or another 
“constitutionally mandated body.”25 
In instances where these institu-
tions have not created judicial per-
formance commissions, the ABA 
envisions the state bar associa-
tion developing its own evaluation 
methods.26
The criteria to evaluate judges 
are explicit. Judges should be evalu-
ated on their legal ability, integrity, 
impartiality, communication skills, 
professionalism, temperament, 
administrative capacity, and any 
other criteria specific to jurisdic-
tion or level of court that is deemed 
appropriate.27 Those who should 
be consulted during the evaluation 
process include judges, lawyers, and 
members of the public that are famil-
iar with the system (e.g., jurors, staff 
members, witnesses, members of law 
enforcement, etc.).28 Unfortunately, 
the methodology for evaluating 
judges is less clear. Currently, there 
is no universal template, so states 
are left to devise their own evalua-
tion instruments. The only guidance 
given by the ABA is to utilize experts 
when developing the evaluation 
tools.29
There is one recommenda-
tion provided by the ABA that we 
believe has not been completed as 
diligently as necessary. According to 
the ABA, once evaluation programs 
are created and implemented, they 
should be evaluated periodically to 
ensure the information obtained is 
reliable and unbiased.30 In light of 
recent research that has indicated 
there is significant bias in several 
JPEs,31 it is critical that commis-
sions and legislatures redouble their 
efforts to guard against any inherent 
unfairness and biases in their pro-
grams. By standardizing the work of 
commissions, their output can focus 
on the production of reliable voter 
information instead of the all-or-
nothing recommendation that has 
come to dominate JPE reports.
The Case of Colorado
Colorado’s JPE system is the most 
expensive and ambitious of its kind.32 
It attempts a “360- degree” review33 
process by including a number of 
different metrics and constituen-
cies in its evaluation process. The 
judges are selected through a merit 
system. By law, each judge serves an 
initial term of two years and must 
stand for retention during the next 
general election. In advance of these 
elections, each justice on the ballot 
undergoes a review process. These 
evaluations are conducted by the 
Colorado Office of Judicial Perfor-
mance Evaluation.
The uniquely decentralized 
system is a hallmark of Colorado’s 
JPE commissions. The commissions 
were created by law in 1988 “for the 
purpose of providing voters with 
fair, responsible and constructive 
evaluations of judges and justices 
seeking retention.”34 The 22 judicial 
districts in Colorado each have their 
own commissions. Figure 1 shows a 
map of these districts. A statewide 
commission evaluates judges on the 
supreme court and court of appeals.
PN: [Figure 1 about here]
The commissions are made up of 
both attorneys and non-attorneys. 
The representation of laypeople on 
the commissions has been hailed 
from the beginning as an important 
contributor to the legitimacy and 
fairness of the evaluation process.35 
Each member is appointed by an 
officer of state government: the gov-
ernor, the chief justice, the speaker 
of the house, or the president of the 
senate. Each appointed commis-
sioner serves a four-year term that is 
once renewable.
The commissions evaluate all 
judges on several dimensions of judi-
cial performance, each derived from 
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the ABA’s Guidelines.36 These perfor-
mance categories include integrity, 
legal knowledge, communication 
skills, judicial temperament, admin-
istrative performance, and service to 
the legal profession and the public. 
The commissioners are instructed 
to use a number of different sources 
of information in their evaluations, 
including surveys of attorneys and 
non-attorneys, a judge’s self-eval-
uation, interviews with the judge, 
written judicial decisions, court-
room observation, and administra-
tive statistics.
The commissions weigh a number 
of pieces of evidence in their delib-
erations, all of which must be shared 
with the judge evaluated. However, 
only a few components of the com-
mission deliberations are ever made 
public via the official website37: a 
short narrative, the aggregate-level 
results of the survey data, and the 
official recommendation of the com-
mission. Three possible recommen-
dations exist: Retain, Do Not Retain, 
and No Opinion.38 Additionally, if the 
commission believes a judge has a 
significant weakness, it can recom-
mend a performance-improvement 
plan to address the area of concern. 
From 2002 through 2012, the com-
missions evaluated 1,176 judges and 
made “Do Not Retain” recommenda-
tions in 17 cases; during the same 
period, a total of 10 judges lost their 
retention elections. Figure 1 shows 
the distribution of negative recom-
mendations across the judicial dis-
tricts.
There are many qualities about 
the Colorado JPE system that should 
be commended. It allows for consid-
erable citizen input; it takes into con-
sideration more than just attorney 
surveys; it surveys laypeople and 
collects additional evidence through 
interviews and work product 
samples; it also allows judges the 
chance to evaluate themselves and 
defend their performance to the 
commission.
The development of Colorado’s 
comprehensive state-sponsored 
JPE system was in part a reaction 
to the perceived weaknesses of the 
bar polls that were common in many 
states at the time. The indepen-
dent groups pushing for a JPE over-
haul argued that citizens had little 
faith in these polls, largely because 
“many [citizens] especially distrust 
lawyers.”39 But early studies of Colo-
rado’s system revealed some disturb-
ing findings. About 10 years into the 
system, a 1998 American Judicature 
Society study surveyed Colorado 
judges about their impressions of 
the JPE process.40 Only 61 percent of 
the judges agreed or strongly agreed 
with the following statements:
1) “I have an adequate opportunity 
to respond to commission results 
before they are made public”;
2) “The overall process used by 
the evaluation commission to collect 
information about my performance 
is fair.”
Only about 30 percent of judges 
agreed with a third question:
3) “Judges have access to a fair 
appeals process if they disagree with 
the commission’s report.”
Colorado addressed the concerns 
expressed by judges in question 1 
and 3 above by incorporating an 
enhanced process through which 
judges can respond to the commis-
sion’s report in advance of its publi-
cation.41 Judges are now afforded the 
opportunity to respond to unfavor-
able recommendations with a state-
ment of 100 words or less, which 
the commission must publish along 
with its report and recommendation. 
The first such response appeared in 
2008.
The lackluster response to ques-
tion 2 above, however, remains 
largely unaddressed. In the context 
of a system where judges almost uni-
versally receive “Retain” recommen-
dations,42 it is difficult to attribute 
this to sour grapes. The only specific 
guidance provided to the commis-
sions is what information must be 
consulted and which qualities ought 
to be considered; commissions are 
on their own when it comes to deter-
mining how to interpret, weight, and 
assemble this information.43
To be sure, the commissions still 
rarely give “Do Not Retain” recom-
mendations; indeed, only about 
one percent of the total evaluations 
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completed between 2002 and 2012 
resulted in this negative recommen-
dation. In some cases these designa-
tions can seem a bit arbitrary. In one 
example, a county judge was heavily 
criticized by lawyers in the evalua-
tion survey for failing to maintain a 
professional demeanor in the court-
room. This judge’s retention score on 
the attorney survey was 20 percent 
lower than other county judges. His 
commission recommended retention 
despite these criticisms.44
Judges receiving negative ratings 
might justly complain. In fact, all but 
one of the judges who submitted a 
response to a “Do Not Retain” or “No 
Opinion” rating criticized the com-
missions’ selective use and arbitrary 
inflation of negative feedback. One 
judge noted that “[t]he Commission 
disregarded the overall presumptive 
‘retain’ score on my performance 
survey results.” Another judge’s 
frustration was even more force-
ful; she ends her response with the 
typeface observation, a “MAJORITY 
(78%) RECOMMENDS THAT I BE 
RETAINED.”45
Unpacking the Commissions’ Ratings
It is difficult for the judges, let alone 
the public, to know exactly what sort 
of analysis underlies the decisions of 
these commissions. Certainly this is 
partly intentional, at least as it con-
cerns the precise nature of the evi-
dence presented to the commissions. 
The rules that govern the process 
require that the commission goes 
into executive session for “[c]onsid-
eration of confidential materials as 
part of an evaluation of a justice or 
a judge, including deliberations.”46 
Indeed, Part III of the ABA Guide-
lines also recommends that with the 
exception of the results intended for 
public consumption, “the data and 
results should be confidential.”47
Raw interview and courtroom 
observation data are not provided to 
the public, neither is the information 
solicited by the commissions from 
the district administrator about 
“information concerning the casel-
oad, case types, open case reports, 
and case aging reports.”48 The judges 
must undergo a self-evaluation as 
well, but this information is also 
missing from the public profile. For 
appellate court judges, the writing 
samples are by and large publicly 
available, the exception being the 
one unpublished decision appel-
late judges are required to submit. 
However, the reports do not indicate 
which opinion the judge submitted.
Perhaps more alarmingly, the rules 
allow the commissions to interview 
other interested persons concerning 
the judge being evaluated. They are 
also authorized to accept unsolicited 
feedback from the public, as long as 
such submission is not anonymous.49 
This information is not presented in 
raw form, of course, for confidenti-
ality reasons. However, it is difficult 
for the public have a sense of how 
the raw data are translated into the 
summary reports provided as voter 
information guides.
What we can do is to use the 
information we can access to deter-
mine what predicts positive recom-
mendation results. To accomplish 
this, we have assembled a dataset 
that includes information from the 
publicly-available survey results, 
coupled with some additional mea-
sures to stand as proxies for judicial 
ability.50 Between 2002 and 2012, 
the Colorado JPE commissions con-
ducted 623 pre-election evaluations 
of judges.51 Of these, five were “Do 
Not Retain” recommendations, and 
four were “No Opinion” recommen-
dations. This means 98.56 percent 
of all commission recommendations 
were positive.
PN: [Table 1 about here]
PN: [Table 2 about here]
In Table 2, we present a number of 
bivariate analyses comparing values 
of some important variables for those 
who get positive as opposed to nega-
tive recommendations from the com-
missions. We have taken data from 
the publicly available performance 
evaluations and supplemented it 
with information from official judge 
biographies and other publicly avail-
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able information (See Table 1). The 
results here show that the percent-
age of attorneys who recommend 
retention in the attorney survey is a 
strong driver of commission recom-
mendations. In addition, judges who 
are perceived to be biased52 are more 
likely to be in the negative recom-
mendation group. In the bivariate 
analyses, layperson “Retain” scores 
are also related to the commis-
sion’s recommendation. The average 
number of years since bar admission 
is slightly lower among those judges 
with negative recommendations. 
Finally, female judges are more likely 
to receive negative recommenda-
tions. There are a total of 165 evalu-
ations of female judges in our data. 
A total of six female judges, or 3.64 
percent, received negative recom-
mendations. This is as compared 
with only 0.66 percent of male judges 
with negative recommendations.
PN: [Table 1 about here]
In Table 3, we report the results 
of a model predicting positive com-
mission recommendations. We use 
a logistic regressional model to 
estimate the probability that any 
given judge will earn a positive (or 
“Retain”) recommendation from the 
commission. We have clustered 
the observations by judge to control 
for the non-independence of mul-
tiple observations when calculating 
the standard errors. In this model, 
we include only trial court judges, as 
attorney bias scores and layperson 
“Retain” scores were not collected by 
the state commission for the appel-
late court judges.
It is clear from this analysis that 
the effects of the attorney bias scale, 
the layperson “Retain” scores, and 
the time on the bench were signifi-
cant in the bivariate analyses only to 
the degree that they overlapped with 
or informed the attorney “Retain” 
scores. Indeed, the summary results 
of the attorney survey are the most 
significant predictor of commis-
sion recommendations by far. This 
is represented graphically in Figure 
2. This figure shows the impor-
tant relationship between attorney 
“Retain” scores and the final com-
mission recommendation. The prob-
ability of a positive recommendation 
approaches 1 as the attorney retain 
score approaches 100.
PN: [Figure 2 about here]
The more interesting finding is 
how little impact other measurable 
pieces of information have on the 
process. This is especially true given 
that attorney surveys have been 
shown in a number of different con-
texts to manifest gender bias53 and 
broader reliability and alidity prob-
lems,54 even in states with sophisti-
cated JPE systems.55
It is important to remember, of 
course, that we are talking about 
an incredibly small percentage of 
evaluations that result in negative 
commission recommendations. Very 
rarely do incumbent judges get voted 
out of office56—a fact that has been 
cited as a problem with JPE com-
missions. In Colorado, it is quite dif-
ficult even for judges of questionable 
quality to obtain a “Do Not Retain” 
recommendation from the commis-
sions. In 2012, a county judge was 
criticized by attorneys for his unpro-
fessional courtroom demeanor. The 
attorney “Retain” score for this judge 
was a full 20 percent lower than 
the other county judges that year. 
The commission expressed concern 
about the official’s use of biting 
sarcasm in the courtroom, but none-
theless recommended retention. 
Why did this judge get a “Retain” rec-
ommendations when others did not? 
It is difficult to say. In all, there were 
37 evaluations out of 588 at the trial 
court level where the judge scored at 
least 20 percent below the average 
and still received a “Retain” recom-
mendation from the commission.57
Unfortunately, commissions give 
the public precious little informa-
tion about how the recommenda-
tion decision is reached. The post 
hoc justification in the commissions’ 
blurb gives some clues, but the com-
missions vary widely in their atten-
tion to detail and precision in these 
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write-ups. Figure 3 presents a pair 
of actual recommendations from 
the 2012 cycle. The review of Judge 
Tallman provides a good deal of 
information about how the commis-
sion came to its decision to retain 
the judge. The narrative discusses 
potential problems with his skills, 
and it details how it obtained infor-
mation that mitigated the potential 
problems. By contrast, the review of 
Judge Lutz shares very little informa-
tion about the judge. It asserts some 
judicial characteristics, but it does 
not make clear how the commission 
would have come to these under-
standings.
PN: [Figure 3 about here]
As of now, there is no defined 
rubric to guide the evaluation process 
undertaken by each commission. 
It is impossible to know the extent 
to which the commissions vary in 
terms of general procedure, inter-
pretation of evidence, and methods 
of distilling the piles of evidence into 
a rating. What we can see, however, 
is the difference among commissions 
in terms of the quality of information 
they provide to the public.
The discrepancies among commis-
sions in terms of the narratives they 
produce are striking. It is of particu-
lar importance because these nar-
ratives provide the context voters 
rely upon when making their voting 
choices. Some commissions provide 
rich narratives that include back-
ground information about the judge 
as well as a detailed summary of 
both the positive and negative find-
ings derived from the evaluation 
process. Other commissions include 
only the barest facts.
Some include no information 
whatsoever on the findings of the 
evaluation, positive or negative, 
and beyond the blunt instruction to 
“Retain” or “Do Not Retain,” they do 
not provide any helpful guidance for 
the voter.
Charting a Course for Effective 
Commissions
The JPE commission is the key player 
in the JPE process. The commission 
generally has very few binding rules 
to follow and thus has a great deal 
of discretion in how to proceed. The 
commission is generally given a list 
of job performance categories on 
which the judges must be evaluated, 
as well as a suggested list of informa-
tion sources. However, it is usually up 
to the commission to decide for itself 
how to create operational measures 
of these job performance categories. 
The commissions also decide how 
to interpret and weigh the different 
pieces of information they collect.
This preliminary investigation 
suggests the commissions may be 
relying heavily on the attorney 
surveys to identify recipients of 
negative recommendations. In Colo-
rado, especially, these commissions 
are spending a good deal of time col-
lecting additional information, but 
it is not clear that this is contribut-
ing anything to the ultimate recom-
mendations or narrative summaries 
that are the deliverable results of the 
deliberation process. Given the well 
documented problems with attorney 
surveys,58 this may prove problem-
atic.
The commissions should focus on 
improving and standardizing the 
constituent parts of the JPE. Perfor-
mance surveys are centrally created 
in Colorado and should be revis-
ited in light of recent scholarship on 
attorney surveys in JPE systems.59 
The remaining parts of the process, 
however, are left mostly to the dis-
cretion of the individual commis-
sions. There is no set protocol for 
interviewing the evaluated judges or 
others. There is no rubric, of which 
we are aware, for evaluating the 
merit of the written opinions or trial 
court transcripts. It is not clear what 
kind of information the judicial self-
evaluation solicits, and we have little 
sense of the role it plays in the rec-
ommendation process. Indeed, we 
cannot opine on the propriety of any 
of these sources of performance data, 
since we have no access to the meth-
odology driving the data collection 
process. Although the ABA is prob-
ably correct in asserting the need for 
confidentiality of the raw data, we 
see no similar need for secrecy in the 
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evaluation methodology.
The commissions in Colorado 
demonstrate a wide variation in the 
quality and depth of information they 
provide for voters. Each evaluation 
results in a summary recommenda-
tion about retention. However, some 
of the narrative reports provide pre-
cious little information to explain 
why a particular judge earned a 
particular recommendation. This 
single-minded focus on the summary 
recommendation is problematic. 
It seems to betray the stated goal 
of providing “information” to the 
voters; instead, it simply tells voters 
how to vote.
If commissions are going to 
produce firm retention recommen-
dations as their output, there is a 
strong need for more transparent 
and rigorous procedures for inter-
preting and weighting the various 
pieces of evidence in the production 
of this recommendation.60 However, 
we strongly recommend avoid-
ing this problem by discontinuing 
the practice. Although such recom-
mendations are nearly ubiquitous 
in state-sponsored JPE programs, 
we ought not accept the practice 
without serious reflection on the 
implications. In states like Colorado, 
the commissions produce a narrative 
and a retention recommendation 
for each judge they evaluate. This 
information is then distributed to 
the public as widely as the commis-
sions have the capacity to manage.61 
When the focus is on the retention 
recommendation, the distribution of 
this information amounts to a state-
sponsored commission endorsement 
(or not) of a candidate for election.62
This is not to say that the com-
missions should provide no infor-
mation or analysis to the voters; 
we strongly believe that they must. 
Even if we put aside the problem of 
confidentiality, it simply would not 
do to have the commission narra-
tives be a mere accounting of the raw 
data obtained through the various 
evaluation components. The voters 
are generally laypeople, and they 
often lack the specialized knowl-
edge needed to make sense of the 
various markers of judicial perfor-
mance. This information needs to 
be contextualized for the voters. For 
example, it is not enough to say, 85 
percent of respondents thought the 
judge had an appropriate judicial 
temperament. Voters need the com-
mission to define judicial tempera-
ment and explain why the attribute 
is particularly important for a judge 
in a court of law. They need the com-
mission to set this number against 
the judge’s peers, as well as against 
the judge’s prior performance. If the 
judge is flippant about the issue in 
an interview or a self-evaluation, the 
commission can explain to the voters 
why this might prove to be a continu-
ing problem with this judge.
In pursuit of this goal, we suggest 
that states devise templates for 
their commissions to follow when 
writing their narratives and sum-
marizing their findings. These tem-
plates should lay out the specific 
background information for all nar-
ratives to include. Narratives should 
include a space for a summary of the 
findings for each performance cat-
egory. In turn, each summary should 
indicate the contribution of every 
source of information (e.g., attor-
ney surveys, interviews, analysis of 
transcripts, etc.). Furthermore, the 
template should include a rubric for 
determining, for example, how one 
judge’s scores on a particular item 
are significantly different from the 
scores of her peers. The top narrative 
in Figure 3 comes much closer to this 
ideal than does the bottom one.
Of course, there is a fine line here 
between providing interpreted 
information and recommending a 
specific course of action to the voter. 
If the commissions are doing their 
jobs, some narratives will read more 
positively than others. The informa-
tion provided by the commissions 
should be accessible enough for the 
layperson to make up her own mind 
but stop somewhere short of simply 
telling her how to vote. e
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table 1. Descriptive Statistics
 All Judges 2002-2012 Trial Court Judges 2002-2012
 mean sd min max n mean sd min max n
“Do Not Retain” Recommend     5     5
“No Opinion” Recommend     4     4
“Retain” Recommend     614     579
Attorney Retain Score 88.83 10.81 35.00 100.00 621 88.95 11.03 35.00 100.00 586
Attorney Bias Scale      0.34 0.23 0.00 1.00 478
Layperson Retain      89.13 8.92 50.00 100.00 590
Critical New Stories 0.13 0.34 0.00 11.00 623 0.11 0.64 0.00 11.00 588
Time Since Bar Admit 27.01 7.49 3.00 46.00 612 27.77 7.48 3.00 46.00 577
Years on Bench 9.47 7.39 1.00 38.00 622 9.61 7.45 1.00 38.00 587
Number of Reversals 1.34 3.45 0.00 31.00 623 1.06 2.52 0.00 22.00 588
Law School Prestige 2.81 1.08 1.00 6.00 620 2.86 1.08 1.00 6.00 585
In-State JD Degree 0.53 0.50 0.00 1.00 619 0.54 0.50 0.00 1.00 584
Female Judge 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00 623 0.27 0.44 0.00 1.00 588
12    JUDICATURE   e    JULY  /  AUGUST  2014    e    VOL  98  NO 1
table 2. bivariate analyses of commission Recommendations and 
Various explanations
 mean mean
Explanation Positive negative n significance
Attorney Retain Score 89.09 71.33 621 t = -4.99 p = 0.000 ***
Attorney Bias Scale 0.34 0.55 478 t = 2.45 p = 0.007 **
Layperson Retain Score 89.25 82.89 590 t = -2.13 p = 0.017 *
Critical News Stories 0.12 0.56 623 t = 1.14 p = 0.142
Time Since Bar Admit 27.04 24.67 612 t = -2.63 p = 0.012 **
Years on Bench 9.47 9.11 622 t = -0.15 p = 0.442
Reversals 1.70 0.60 495 t = -1.76 p = 0.929
Law School Prestige 2.81 3.00 620 χ2(5) = 8.19 p = 0.146
In-State JD 53.77 33.33 619 χ2(1) = 1.49 p = 0.222
Female Judge   623 χ2(1) = 7.57 p = 0.006 **
The number of observations differs among these variables because 1) the pieces of information collected for appellate and district judges are 
different, and 2) the difficulty in finding suitable sources of biographical information for judges no longer sitting on the bench.
table 3. logistic Regression Predicting Positive commission 
Recommendations
model of Positive Commission Recommendation (Trial Courts)
 odds Ratio Robust std. Err. z p > |z|
Attorney Retain Score 1.079 0.023 3.57 0.000 ***
Attorney Bias Scale 0.652 0.671 -0.42 0.678
Layperson Retain Score 1.033 0.051 0.64 0.519
Critical News Stories 0.552 0.197 -1.66 0.096
Time Since Bar Admit 0.960 0.057 -0.68 0.498
Years on Bench 1.006 0.046 0.14 0.889
Reversals 1.551 0.957 0.71 0.477
Law School Prestige 0.894 0.348 -0.29 0.744
In-State JD 3.591 3.184 1.32 0.188
Female Judge 0.147 0.137 -2.06 0.040 *
Constant 0.045 0.187 -0.74 0.459
Logistic regression with clustered standard errors. n = 574 observations, standard errors clustered over 348 individual judges. Wald χ2 = 91.16 
***, Pseudo R2 = 0.2922. Correctly Classified: 98.26%. These findings are robust to the inclusion of appellate court judges, which requires 
removal of the layperson Retain score (as this information is not collected for appellate court judges).
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FiGuRe 1. commission Districts and negative Recommendations
FiGuRe 2. Predicted Probability of Positive Recommendation with 90% 
confidence
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FiGuRe 1. two JPe commission narratives from 2012
